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ABSTRACT. Against the background of ongoing global crisis of capitalism, the article 
reflects on the most important and intriguing contributions of the French Regulation 
School within the Marxist tradition to critical international political economy. In particu-
lar, it examines and critiques the respective theses of principal regulationists—Aglietta, 
Lipietz, and Boyer—about capitalist stability, contradictions, dynamics, and relations. 
Aglietta’s limited conception of crises and contradictions is scrutinised by proposing a 
framework of agential-structural interrelations—specifically, the interactions between 
class struggle and market-dependence—in understanding capitalist relations and proc-
esses. Lipietz’s level of analysis on ‘national’ capitalism is questioned with a 
comprehension of the global character and universalising tendencies of capitalism. And 
Boyer’s reading of finance-led growth as the new regime of accumulation is explored 
with an argument to put more significance on reproduction than regulation and to bring 
back production and its interaction with the system of exchange in the analysis of capi-
talist development. The conclusion proposes a synthesis of regulation approach and the 
concepts from classical Marxism to better capture the specificities of contemporary capi-
talist development. 
Introduction 
The world capitalist system is under the conglomeration of interdependent and interrelated 
crises. This time around the epicentre of the global economic crisis was the United States 
from where it rapidly spilt over into a concatenation of crises in the advanced industrial 
economies of Europe. It has become palpably evident that the recent catastrophe is a culmina-
tion of the cumulative effects of the simultaneous crises in finance, production, food, 
environment, energy, and governance that have been plaguing the world since neoliberalism 
replaced the Keynesian economic model during the 1970s crises. Just in the last 20 years both 
the developed and developing world, in varying degrees, have gone through a series of major 
economic, financial, currency, banking, and debt crises in, inter alia, Scandinavia (early 
1990s), Mexico (1994), East and Southeast Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Argentina (2001), 
Turkey (2001), US (2007), and Europe (2010). Certainly, these economic crises engender 
political conflicts over power and resources between social classes across nations. But why 
does capitalism, despite it being ridden with economic crises and social conflicts, continue to 
thrive and survive? 
The Regulation Approach (RA) in the field of international political economy (IPE) at-
tempts to offer specific institutional answers to this puzzling question on the capacity and 
capability of the capitalist system to expand and to stabilise for a fairly long period notwith-
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standing its inherent structural contradictions. Michel Aglietta (1979), the pioneer of RA, 
elucidates the ‘essential idea’ of his seminal work A Theory of Regulation: ‘that the dynamism 
of capital represents an enormous productive potential but that it is also a blind force. It does 
not contain a self-limiting mechanism of its own, nor is it guided in a direction that would 
enable it to fulfil the capitalists’ dream of perpetual accumulation’ (Aglietta 1998: 49). Build-
ing on Aglietta’s conceptual and theoretical frameworks, Alain Lipietz (1985a) and Robert 
Boyer (1990) subsequently made their respective contributions to RA in explaining one of 
IPE’s research problematiques. 
This article reflects on the somewhat different but largely complementary contributions of 
Aglietta, Lipietz, and Boyer or the so-called French Regulation School.2 It must be noted that 
RA is but one of the theoretical schools within the Marxist tradition that attempts to provide 
an essential understanding of the forces at work behind the crisis of accumulation (see Jessop 
1990; Robles 1994; Jessop and Sum 2006). In the critical IPE literature, French Regulation 
Theory arose at about the same time as, and bears some resemblance to, the American ‘Social 
Structure of Accumulation Theory’ (SSA), which was introduced at the beginning of the 
1980s by a group of economists, notably, David Gordon, Samuel Bowles, Richard Edwards, 
Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf who studied the history of capitalist development in 
the United States with particular emphasis on the changing patterns of capital accumulation 
and the changes in labour processes and in the structure of labour markets (Gordon 1978; 
Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1983; see also Kotz 
1990, 1994; Kotz, McDonough, and Reich 1994; McDonough, Reich, and Kotz 2010). A key 
difference between RA and SSA has to do with the orientation or focus of analysis. Whilst 
RA can be said to be more of a ‘structuralist’, SSA is more inclined to ‘voluntarist’ interpreta-
tions of the processes of accumulation and change. Here then lies the strengths and 
weaknesses of these respective approaches. Whilst RA puts much importance on structural 
forces and their tendencies, SSA privileges the question of agency particularly class struggle 
and other conflicts in the accumulation process. As such, RA offers inadequate attention to 
class struggle, whereas SSA gives insufficient attention to the forces and imperatives of struc-
tures (see Kotz 1990, 1994; cf. Aglietta 1979). Furthermore, in comparison with RA, which is 
more of a progressive academic research programme to analyse, rather than propose alterna-
tives to, the capitalist system (Jessop 2001a), SSA combines academic endeavour with a 
workers-led political project by categorically proposing democratic alternatives to the crises 
and contradictions of capitalism (see, e.g., Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1983; Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich 1982). 
RA puts forward four fundamental theses. First, a society, as well as the economic activities 
within it, is viewed as a ‘network of social relations’. Second, social relations are ‘contradic-
tory’ whereby crisis is ‘normal’ and non-crisis ‘a rather chance event’. Third, there are 
periods of stability in the reproduction of capitalist social relations. This continuing system is 
a regime of accumulation. In particular, post-World War II regime of accumulation was re-
ferred to as ‘Fordism’, characterized by mass production (i.e., assembly line production) and 
mass consumption by the working class. And fourth, there are ways through which this re-
gime of accumulation is achieved. It is institutionalized in the modes of regulation, which are 
a set of behavioural patterns and institutions (Lipietz 1987a; see also Lipietz 1986). 
What concerns this article is the examination of the RA research programme in understand-
ing capitalism through a critical enquiry of whether the approach does indeed provide 
plausible answers to its main question on the perpetuation of capitalist expansion and stabil-
ity. It reflects upon the claims of the RA by examining its fundamental theses and its 
methodological, epistemological, and ontological assumptions as advanced by the pioneer 
regulationists, namely, Aglietta, Lipietz, and Boyer. To this end, it recognises that the regula-
tionists’ agenda is ‘to develop institutionally sensitive comparative and historical analyses of 
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capitalism rather than to look beyond capitalism(s) in order to propose alternative, post-
capitalist modes of production and/or regulation’ (Jessop 2001a: 90). 
The argument of this article is developed in the four sections that respectively address the 
essential theoretical claims of the principal regulationists. The first section scrutinises Agli-
etta’s proposition that the root of capitalist crises is the upsurge of class struggle. It then 
makes a proposal of synthesising this largely agential reading with an appreciation of ‘mar-
ket-dependence’ as a fundamental structural contradiction of capitalism—that is, that the 
survival and reproduction of both capital and labour depend on the market. The second sec-
tion questions Lipietz’s fixation with ‘national’ capitalism and his refusal to integrate global 
capitalism as a system in the regulation research programme. The third section provides a case 
for the theoretical power of classical Marxist’s analysis on the self-expansion of capital 
through the concepts of reproduction and production as opposed to Boyer’s privileging on 
regulation and exchange. The fourth and concluding section reflects on the limitations of RA 
and thereby suggests that RA’s focus on agency, national capitalism, regulation, and exchange 
be synthesised with the classical Marxist concepts of structure, global capitalism, reproduc-
tion, and production. Such synthesis is crucial to RA’s need to remain relevant. 
Michel Aglietta: On Crises and Contradictions of Capitalism 
One of the core theses of RA is that capitalism is always in crisis; and that its structure is 
contradictory. There are, however, periods when the system stabilises after a series of rup-
tures. Thus, understanding the dynamics of crisis and contradiction of the capitalist system is 
crucial to an enquiry as to the epistemology and ontology of the theory. 
For Aglietta (1979), the main source of crisis and contradiction is class struggle. Coming 
from the discipline of macroeconomics, he uses the analogy of the relationship between De-
partment I (production) and Department II (consumption) in which under the capitalist system 
the former tends to develop more rapidly than the latter. Whilst Aglietta does not explicitly 
espouse the ‘disproportionality theory of crises’ in which capitalism tendentially overpro-
duces far more than what can be consumed; he asserts that ‘[t]he root of these crises is always 
the upsurge of class struggle in production, which jeopardizes the expanded creation of sur-
plus value on the basis of the prevailing organization of the labour process’ (Aglietta 1979: 
352). To realise the system’s stability—that is, to have a harmony between production and 
consumption even though the former almost always overwhelms the latter—capitalist produc-
tion must revolutionise the conditions of existence of the working class. 
This stabilisation mechanism of capitalism was manifest as shown in Aglietta’s study of the 
long boom in the United States under the Fordist development model in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Aglietta 1979; cf. Aglietta 1998, 2000). Capitalism’s overproduction tendencies were sub-
dued by combining further transformations in the labour and production processes with the 
formation of a social consumption norm to ensure the development of relative harmony be-
tween Department I and Department II. In concrete terms, the adoption of semi-automatic 
assembly-line production was matched with an intensive process of the commodification of 
everyday life and the project of a welfare state that encouraged and underwrote mass con-
sumption. Moreover, the period of Fordism represented a fairly stable regime of accumulation 
that was also wary of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Since self-correcting mecha-
nisms in the capitalist system is nonexistent, this particular phase of regular accumulation is 
attained through institutional fixes in labour-production patterns and cultural norms. 
Capitalist crises and contradictions are the subject and object of the mode of regulation in 
establishing a regime of accumulation—that is, a longer-term period of systemic stability. 
However, Aglietta’s relatively narrow conceptions of these phenomena pose important limita-
Bonn Juego                                                                                                                           IJIS Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011 
58 
tions on the analysis of capitalist dynamics. By reducing the contradiction in capitalism to 
mere distributional conflict between capital and labour, Aglietta glosses over the imperatives 
of the capitalist structure—particularly, the dependence of these conflicting agents of capital 
and labour on the market structure. Whilst class struggle is indeed a contradiction in capital-
ism and also the motor of historical change, it is essential to relate this agential class conflict 
with the broader structural contradictions of market-dependence (cf. Wood 2001, 2007). 
There is, of course, no clean separation or rigid distinction between structure and agency; 
hence, both have to be viewed in evolving interacting moments and in dialectical terms. Capi-
tal and labour depend on the market for their survival and reproduction; and it is this 
contradiction that capitalist institutions are trying to resolve, to regulate, and to reproduce all 
at the same time. Aglietta’s approach founders on its theoretical and methodological inability 
to grapple with the contradiction of market-dependence. In particular, the concepts of regime 
of accumulation and mode of regulation which point to class struggle—meaning, that a period 
of stability is achieved when there is a harmonious relationship between capital and labour, 
and that this could be realised through an ensemble of norms, institutions, relationships, and 
the like—do not profoundly capture the logic of capitalist reproduction. At the heart of this 
logic is the reproduction of multifaceted conflicts between agents and structure, between 
competing capitalists, and within conflicting labour themselves. 
The contradiction of market-dependence starts from the proposition that capitalist social 
relations—including the processes of production, appropriation, and distribution—are ‘medi-
ated at all points by exchange’.3 In other words, capital and labour, individually or in relation 
to one another, are dependent on the market. This argument is best laid out by Ellen Meiksins 
Wood (2001: 284): ‘Market dependence in capitalism constitutes a fundamental contradiction 
because, as in no other social form, it is a fundamental condition of survival and social repro-
duction, on which it imposes its imperatives of competition and profit-maximization’. 
There is a dependent relationship between capital and labour; but this relationship is rein-
forced by the market, guaranteeing a structure of the real subsumption of labour to capital. A 
deeper contradiction therefore underpins Aglietta’s notion of a ‘national bargain’ between 
state, capital, and labour where, such as in the Fordist experience, a relatively harmonious 
relationship among them leads to stability. It is for this reason that RA does not adequately 
capture how the dynamics between capital and labour work as market-dependent classes. 
Take for example what Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (2001) refers to as a ‘negotiated contradic-
tion’, which looks beyond the struggle between the two antagonistic classes.  Workers are a 
class not only in permanent conflict but also in permanent negotiation with those who pay 
them wages. Within the system of capitalism, the most powerful negotiators are the capitalists 
who are going to do everything they can to weaken the negotiating power of the workers, 
constructing social spaces where the owners are stronger and the workers are weaker. Capital 
is able to make labour negotiate from a position of weakness. Reinforcing this capital offen-
sive against labour are the states, working all together in the essential common task of 
maintaining the hegemony of capital over labour, and not merely the peaceful coexistence 
between them. 
In its attempt to take account of the stabilising potential of capitalism despite its conflictual 
and antagonistic nature as well as its provisional, unstable, and contradictory character, RA 
introduces the notion of regulation to complement and modify the old Marxist conception of 
‘reproduction’ (see Jessop 2001b; Jessop and Sum 2006). It has however become obsessed 
with regulation—specifically, the institutional antidote to resolve crises. Consequently, it has 
systematically neglected the very existence of capitalist institutions. Under conditions of 
capitalism, institutions do not simply work for the establishment of equilibrium between 
production and consumption, nor do they merely resolve class struggle and regulate market 
failure. All capitalist social institutions enforce the imperatives of market dependence (Wood 
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2001). At the heart of their objective is the maintenance of the hegemony of capital over 
labour, and not the stability of the system of contented workers. Capitalist institutions are all 
too aware that there is always resistance from workers and all the exploited groups in their 
drive for capital accumulation. Yet, it must be noted that this does not preclude the reality that 
these institutions are also market-dependent, and hence subject to the inherent precariousness 
and instability of the capitalist mode of production. The notion of a ‘regime of accumulation’ 
as a long period of relative stability is thus, to a large extent, misleading because capitalism is 
as ever crisis- and conflict-ridden. 
The contradictions of market-dependence constitute class struggle. Whilst it is certain that 
class struggle can tremendously affect profitability, there exists an inherent contradiction 
within the relations of capital—even in the presence or absence of their conflict with labour—
and that is the need for capitalists not only to cooperate but also to compete with one another 
in order to increase the rate of profit and lower the cost of labour. This internal structural 
contradiction is not solely caused by agential class struggle, and can neither be corrected by 
the absence of it (Wood 2001). It is simply the contradictory logic in the regime of capitalist 
accumulation: its dependence on its own structural relationships that, on the one hand, gener-
ates surplus and pressures towards convergence but, on the other hand, also produces 
conflicts, incoherence, vulnerabilities, and resistances. 
Alain Lipietz: On National Capitalism and World Capitalism 
The limitations of the RA’s privileging of regulation—particularly, the concepts of regime of 
accumulation and mode of regulation—is once again manifested in its level of analysis. RA 
utilises ‘an implicit critical realist ontology and epistemology’ in which capitalism is exam-
ined ‘as a specific object of inquiry with specific structures and mechanisms rather than 
presenting an underlabouring philosophical argument for the validity of critical realism in 
general’ (Jessop 2001a: 90). Its focus is on the specificity of individual national situations, 
‘studying long run transformations of national economies, by working out systemic interna-
tional comparisons’ (Boyer 2010). Consider the straightforward, yet provocative and 
contradictory, statements of Alain Lipietz (1987a) on RA’s level of analysis. 
First, Lipietz recognises the reality of the internationalisation of production and the need for 
RA to integrate this phenomenon into the research programme. He notes that: 
The theme of the internationalization of production has become increasingly important for the 
whole approach. In the beginning, our main field of research was Fordism, which was one of the 
most nation-centered regimes of accumulation in history...Fordism was almost a simple juxtapo-
sition of national regimes! As a result, we didn’t pay much attention to the international situation. 
Second, there is neither regime of accumulation nor mode of regulation at the international 
level because of the absence of states to guarantee them. Lipietz argues that: 
[S]ince one of the two main causes of the crisis is the contradiction between the internationaliza-
tion of production and markets and the national character of regulation, we were obliged to study 
the world as a system, and to study the ways that national regimes could exist within that system. 
Hence, we had to ask whether there was such a thing as a regime of accumulation at the world 
level or a mode of regulation at the world level. In short, up to now our answer has been: there is 
something like a mode of regulation, a kind of consensus about some institutions and some be-
havior since 1945. The problem is that these forms of regulation are not guaranteed by any state. 
Rather, to the extent that they have existed, they are due to the hegemony of one particular na-
tional state, the United States of America. 
And third, RA is not to ‘deduce’ the reality in the nation ‘from the ghost that would be world 
capitalism’. Here is Lipietz’s explanation on this point: 
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As far as the regime, in the French meaning of the term, is concerned - that is, a regular match 
between transformations in production and transformations in consumption - no such thing exists 
at the international level. My conclusion is that it doesn’t exist. We can speak at most of a kind of 
‘international configuration’, and these configurations are subject to shifts, continuous displace-
ment…. 
We have to elaborate a little more on that subject because our main tendency is to study each 
country, each national reality one by one. I think that’s a very good way of approaching the prob-
lem. We must start from enough cases and from the reality of each nation. We should never 
deduce the situation of any nation - Mali, Nigeria, Peru - from the ghost that would be world 
capitalism. But, since the various national models of development and various national regimes 
of accumulation are obviously in contact with each other, we have to think of something like a 
regime at the world level. 
On the whole, RA analyses the dynamics of capitalism and the resolution of class struggle at 
the level of the nation-state; and that the world economy is simply a congeries of autonomous 
national capitalisms (see Lipietz 1987a, 1987b, 1987c). Lipietz’s statements however reveal a 
couple of contradictions. One, he contradicts the critical realist ontology and epistemology, 
which is one of the substantive features of RA, by basing reality upon its conformation with 
the discursive definition of a mode of regulation and the regime of accumulation rather than 
the other way around. It appears that the mere absence of régime, in its original French signi-
fication (i.e., a regular match between transformations in both production and consumption), 
is ground enough for dismissing an international analysis of capitalism as a system. And two, 
Lipietz contradicts the insightful pronouncement of his RA colleague, Aglietta, who posits 
that ‘the key theoretical process [of RA]…lies in a radical change in the conditions of repro-
duction of capital in general’ (Aglietta 1979: 20-21).4 The intensification of global capitalism 
has radically changed the conditions of capital, subjecting each and every pore of the society 
within the world system to the logics of competition, commodification, and profit-
maximisation (see Wood 2001, 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002). This ‘universalisation of capi-
talism’ also comes with the universalisation of the contradictions of class struggle and of 
market-dependence (Wood 2001). 
In contrast to the claim of Lipietz that world capitalism is just a ghost, a mere illusion; this 
historical moment reveals that capitalism has developed to a point where the ‘completion of 
the world market’ becomes the appropriate focus of analysis (Cammack 2003). This project is 
depicted on the process of globalisation where states and all economic agents are compelled 
to adopt policies that would promote the hegemony of capital at the international, regional, 
and national levels (see Albo 2003; Cammack 2004). It globally imposes the disciplines cen-
tral to capitalist reproduction such as the provision of a ‘sound’ macro-economic framework, 
along with structural reforms on liberalisation and privatisation and their attendant regulatory 
innovations at national, regional, and global scales (see Cammack 2003, 2004; Wood 2002). 
Further, a substantial number of researches have empirically proven the case—for instance, on 
World Bank’s comprehensive global institutional strategy for disseminating and legitimising 
capitalism on a global scale as shown in the series of the Bank’s initiatives since the mid-
1990s such as the Report on Observance of Codes and Standards, the Comprehensive Devel-
opment Framework, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Poverty Reduction Growth 
Facility, the streamlining of conditionality, and the reform of sovereign debt restructuring 
(see, e.g., Fine 2001a, 2001b; Cammack 2003, 2004). 
The global capitalist system generates contradictions and crises that cannot be addressed at 
the national level alone. Since the accumulation of capital has increasingly become global and 
so as the nature of class struggle as manifested in the attempts of capitalist forces to secure the 
hegemony of capital and of exploited groups to resist it, international institutions like the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are geared at the governance of the 
general conditions for capitalist accumulation and at resolving the contradictions that capital-
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ism induces (see Cammack 2003). It thus follows that there is no ‘international régime of 
accumulation’ under conditions of global capitalism because the system is always unstable 
and crisis prone, if by ‘régime’ it means the condition of an equilibrium between international 
production and international consumption. 
Surely, there is a clear need to differentiate between national situations. But this analysis 
must be consistent with the systemic unity of capitalism recognising that the self-expansion of 
capital is a dynamic and uneven process, in particular the different projects and strategies 
from state to state in the system to secure the hegemony of capital and the enforcement of 
market-dependence on the global stage. These different domestic configurations within the 
system are a consequence of the uneven and combined character of global capitalist develop-
ment. As David Harvey (1992: 292-293) convincingly explains as regards the drive for capital 
accumulation:  
The focus is on processes, rather than on things and events…[T]o say there is a simple process at 
work is not to say that everything ends up looking exactly the same, that events are easily pre-
dictable or that everything can be explained by reference to it alone…Capitalism has, in short, 
always thrived on the production of difference. 
Apparently, Lipietz recognises the normative on the need of the RA to have an international 
understanding of national situations as the connections among national economies have be-
come increasingly manifested in the global scale. However, in a review of Régulation Theory: 
The State of the Art, an encyclopedic anthology of the works of Parisian regulationists (Boyer 
and Saillard 2002; the original French edition, Boyer and Saillard 1995) where Lipietz is one 
of the contributors, Bob Jessop (2002) takes issue on the failure of the RA protagonists them-
selves to make any reference to, or have a dialogue with, the contributions of other 
regulationists from the important field of enquiry of IPE that understands the interaction 
between national and international scales within wider systemic processes—including those 
from the evolving ‘varieties of capitalism’ research—and from related social science disci-
plines outside (institutional) economics. 
Robert Boyer: On Finance-led Growth as the New Regime of Accumulation 
Robert Boyer, president of the Association of Research and Régulation, is perhaps today’s 
leading regulationist with specific interest in the wage-labour nexus, social systems of innova-
tion, monetary and financial regime, and the process of economic policy formation aiming at 
building an institutional and historical macroeconomic theory (see Boyer 2010; Association 
Recherche & Régulation 2010). Some of his recent works attempt to explore financialisation 
as part of capitalist transformations after the crisis of Fordism and to examine the capacity for 
this new regime to stabilise (see, e.g., Boyer 2000a, 2000b, 2008, 2010). The pressure towards 
financialisation has been a product of the longer term structural transformation of post-Fordist 
capitalist development: from the compromise between managers and wage earners in the 
1960s; through the weakening of the bargaining of power of wage earners due to international 
competition in the 1980s and the deepening of alliance of investors and managers in the 
1990s; to the emerging tensions among different actors within the finance industry (managers, 
auditors, rating agencies, institutional investors, financial analysts, fund managers, and pen-
sion funds) and the rise of lawyers as new actors not only in the judicial institutions but also 
in the sphere of finance (Boyer 2008). 
Having dismissed the alternative regimes proposed to succeed Fordist economic develop-
ment model, Boyer (2000a) puts forward a ‘proposition’, rather than a claim, that the 
emergent financial system plays a potential—if not, the same—stabilising role as did the 
Fordist wage-labour nexus. This finance-led regime is dominated by, but is not solely consti-
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tuted of, finance. The institutional conditions present in the emergent finance-led growth 
regime includes ‘globalized financial regime’ (diffusion of financial norms, dividends and 
pension funds, high stock market price, easy access to credit), ‘shareholder value as a new 
form of competition and governance mode’ (careful management of investment), and ‘highly 
reactive wage labour nexus’ (flexible employment). In other words, the emergent regime 
comes with a whole series of financial innovations and novel economic features such as la-
bour flexibility, price stability, booming stock markets, and credit growth. These institutions 
are different from the preceding growth regimes that did not materialise since the American 
crisis in the late 1960s, namely: Toyotism, service-led, ICT-led, knowledge-based economy, 
competition-led, export-led, finance-led in terms of the transformation in firm governance, the 
employment relation, household consumption, the state form, and monetary policy (Boyer 
2000a; see also Boyer 2008). 
In his recent lecture on the subprime mortgage crisis, Boyer (2008) notes that the US is ‘the 
only finance-led regime’, made possible by a high ratio between financial wealth and income 
and by profit-led investment. However, this new regime is susceptible to macroeconomic 
instability as manifested in the 2007-2008 global economic crisis whose epicentre was at the 
homeland of financialisation itself. Boyer (2008) argues that in order to attain structural sta-
bility, the economic conditions must be conducive to wage formation that is ‘not too much 
competitive’ and a rate of return requirement of shareholders that is ‘not too high’. Based on 
the parameters of ‘average propensity to consume’, ‘wealth in shares’, ‘extent of capital 
gains’, ‘monetary market rate’, ‘return on bonds’, and ‘reference profitability’, Boyer com-
ments that Europe does not observe a finance-led regime because it fares lower percentages in 
all these indicators compared with the US. 
Although limited to the situation of the US, it is a worthwhile academic endeavour to cri-
tique Boyer’s hypothetical case on the possibility of a stable finance-led regime, bearing in 
mind the methodological, ontological, and epistemological inadequacies of RA that have been 
discussed above. Four interrelated issues must be raised regarding his proposition. First, 
Boyer strongly holds on to the idea that stability in the capitalist system could be possibly 
attained through financial revolution and innovations. What he does not seriously consider, 
however, is the realpolitik of a financialised regime under conditions of neoliberal globalisa-
tion that is politically unstable since it is based upon austere welfare, the growing inequality 
among the waged and between the waged and unemployed, and the enlargement of the ‘in-
formal’ sector (see Purcell 2002). Second, the level of analysis problem of the RA has once 
again become apparent in this theme because a financialised regime would be impossible to 
understand without a grasp of the political economy of international finance (Tickell 1999). 
The proposition thus proves unable to analyse the crucial link between global capital and 
national states in this historical moment of the universalisation of capitalism in which, as the 
contradiction of market-dependence implies, every institution is mediated at all points by 
exchange (Wood 2001, 2002). 
Third, Boyer sees the potential of regulation in the fulfilment of a stable financial regime 
through a form of ‘hybridization’ among the previous growth regimes, ‘with a different mix in 
each country according to political and social legacy, economic specialization and, of course, 
the strategic choices of key collective actors’ (Boyer 2000a: 117). Even though RA keeps on 
asserting that regulation complements reproduction, it appears in their analyses that the for-
mer is much more privileged than the latter. Putting primacy to régulation however tends to 
conceal the existence of exploitation, even if the purchasing power of the workers is in-
creased. It is unable to see both the simple and sophisticated ways of capital to profit and 
appropriate from uneven development, the differentiation of social conditions among national 
economies, the preservation of low-cost labour regimes, and the reproduction of relative 
poverty (Wood 2001). Marx’s original conceptualisation of reproduction—the concept that 
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RA claims to modify as well as to complement, if not forgotten—by itself captures not only 
the self-expansion of capital, but the exploitative nature of the system as well: 
Whatever the social form of the production process, it has to be continuous, it must periodically 
repeat the same phases. A society can no more cease to produce than it can cease to consume. 
When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and in the constant flux of its incessant renewal, 
every social process of production is at the same time a process of reproduction. (Marx, Capital I, 
ch. 23) 
Thus, reproduction ‘involves both production and the setting up of conditions whereby pro-
duction can continue to take place’ (Himmelweit, 1991: 469). It entails contradictory 
processes: on the one hand, towards convergence with the reproduction of capitalist institu-
tions on an expanding scale; and on the other hand, the conflicting responses with the 
reproduction of social antagonisms that spring from the conflictual nature of capitalist rela-
tions. 
This point leads, and is closely connected, to the fourth issue on Boyer’s focus on finance.  
Whilst it may be true that the contemporary dominance of finance capital has tremendously 
affected production, ‘the focus should be on production before it turns to exchange’ so as to 
see the ‘uncompromising commitment of capitalist forces to embedding the social and institu-
tional relations that enforce capitalist competition, thereby seeking to ensure that the systemic 
imperatives of capitalism work’ (Cammack 2004: 209). Take for example economic crises 
that have become an enduring characteristic of the capitalist landscape. Even with the intro-
duction of neoliberalism as a reaction to address the series of structural crises in the last 
quarter of the 20th century, the world economy has continuously stumbled with the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, the 2000 dot-com collapse, and the 2008 great recession as the major crises 
implicating economies and societies within the global system—all of which are telling of the 
inherent tendencies of capitalism to create crises and its grave difficulties for the realisation of 
short- and long-term accumulation. As Christopher Rude (2004: 82) convincingly argues: 
[F]inancial instability and the economic hardship that it creates play an essential role in reproduc-
ing capitalist and imperial social relations. The financial instability is functional. It disciplines 
world capitalism. 
But this is precisely the main preoccupation of regulationists: to explain how and why capital-
ism continues to expand. The problem with Boyer’s analytical framework is its failure to look 
beyond the surface of institutions and regimes, and thus systematically unable to dissect the 
deeper structural contradictions and social conflicts within them. This would involve an un-
derstanding of the politics behind the economy, the reproduction of the contradictions of class 
struggle and market-dependence, the ‘negotiated contradiction’ in capital-labour compromise, 
and the production of ‘proletarianisation’ in which workers have no other option but to be 
subjected to a system thoroughly permeated with the imperatives of capitalism. 
It thus appears that the forces of capital, which are embodied in capitalist institutions, act a 
la ‘invisible hand’, but one that does not fix market failures, attempting to convert crisis into 
opportunities for the deepening of capitalist relations. However, no matter how these capitalist 
social institutions try to regulate or resolve the crises and contradictions of capital, the system 
is perpetually haunted by the internal contradictions of the capitalist market and structure: the 
need for different capitals to compete with one another and the perpetual resistance of ex-
ploited groups to establish alternative futures. 
Conclusion 
The Regulation Approach in IPE attempts to provide specific institutional analysis on the 
classic Marxist conundrum about capitalism’s continued survival and reproduction despite its 
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deep structural contradictions and intense class conflicts. Its general framework ‘stresses that 
economic activities are socially embedded and socially regularized and that stable economic 
expansion depends on specific social modes of economic regulation that complement the role 
of market forces in guiding capitalist development’ (Jessop 2008: 24). Indeed, understanding 
the complexities of capitalism is always a theoretically rigorous, yet meaningful, task. As 
Wood (2001: 283) aptly puts it: ‘[C]apital certainly needs ideological mystifications and 
supports, but it may be harder to reveal than to conceal the exploitative nature of the capitalist 
relation, or to conceptualize and capture it in theory’. 
What this article has tried to do is to reflect on this claim of the RA—specifically its funda-
mental theses and epistemological, ontological, and methodological standpoints—and, at the 
same time, to critique the limitations of the respective works of principal regulationists, 
namely, Aglietta, Lipietz, and Boyer. Aglietta’s limited interpretation of crises and contradic-
tions in capitalism has been examined, and thereby putting forward the argument to interrelate 
the agential dimension of class struggle with the structural contradiction of market-
dependence. Lipietz’s privileging of ‘national’ economies and, in effect, his hostility to the 
global systemic unity of capitalism has been questioned—in particular, the absence of an 
analysis of competing national capitalisms within the geographical landscape of global capi-
talism. And Boyer’s framework of analysis and proposition on the possibility of a stable 
finance-led regime has been criticised with an argument about the intrinsic political instability 
of financialisation; the need to relate national capitalist dynamics with global political-
economic structure; and the primacy of reproduction over regulation, and of production over 
exchange in the processes of capital accumulation. 
Despite its limitations, RA offers practical utility for the understanding of socio-economic 
contradictions and processes in capitalist societies by social actors. It has made some impor-
tant contributions to the analysis of capitalist processes and its internal structural logic, 
particularly in the identification of institutions and regulatory mechanisms that attempt to 
stabilise or reinforce capitalist development. As argued and proposed in this article, doing an 
analytical synthesis can complement the theoretical inadequacies of RA. Firstly, Aglietta’s 
agential class struggle conception of crises must be situated within, or in relation to, the wider 
structural contradictions of market-dependence. In doing so, the processes of capitalism and 
social change are regarded in a framework of the enduring tension between structure and 
agency. Secondly, Lipietz’s focus on the dynamics of national capitalism is better understood 
against the background of, and in its relation with, global capitalism. This comprehension of 
the dynamics of national-global relations in the accumulation of capital will enable an analy-
sis of the differences in national situations within a broadly comparative framework and, as 
such, an appreciation of the historical specificities of capitalist development and the nature of 
capitalist diversity from nation to nation within the global structure of accumulation. And 
thirdly, Boyer’s concentration on finance has to be linked with production so as not to reduce 
capitalist processes to mere questions of money and exchange, but as concrete social relations 
involving real issues of power, class, interests, and conflict. In this connection, the idea of 
regulation may be strong in presenting the surface of the presumptive stability of capitalism, 
but it would not be able to unpack the essence of capitalist reproduction. Essentially, repro-
duction entails capitalist production itself and the conditions created to maintain and promote 
the material and ideological hegemony of capitalism at the national and global levels. 
All these proposals to substantiate, enhance, or alter the theoretical framework of RA are 
necessary if it wanted to remain relevant as a cogent explanation of the evolution of capital-
ism not only in its classic cases of developed economies in the US and Europe, but more so in 
the emerging capitalist projects and their conflicts in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The 
main purpose being to come up with a dynamic analysis of the specificities of capitalist de-
velopment applied to the circumstances of contemporary global political economy and its 
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interaction with, or even manifestation in, the particularities of varying national configura-
tions. 
Notes 
1. The author would like to thank the three referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. The in-
puts and critiques from, as well as the discussions with, Jacques Hersh, Henrik Plaschke, and Johannes 
Dragsbaek Schmidt are most valued. They are not to be blamed for any mistakes here or for the author’s 
stubbornness. 
2. There have been several strands within the regulation ‘school’ of which four have been influential, 
namely: Parisian, grenoblois, West German, and radical American (see Jessop 1990; Robles 1994; Jes-
sop and Sum 2006).  
3. The argument on market mediation in capitalist processes is hardly news to regulationists (see Lipietz 
1987a; Jessop 2001a). However, this premise is not consistently and deeply pursued within RA. 
4. Aglietta’s statement is in the context of regulation theory’s rejection of the ‘idea that the concentration of 
capital is the most fundamental process in the history of 20th century capitalism’ (Aglietta 1979: 20). 
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